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THE SIOUX’S SUITS:
GLOBAL LAW AND THE DAKOTA ACCESS
PIPELINE
Stephen M. Young*
ABSTRACT
The Sioux Tribe’s lawsuits and protests against the
Dakota Access Pipelines (DAPL) received an incredible amount
of international attention in ways that many Indigenous peoples’
protests have not. This article argues that attention exists
because the Sioux Tribe has been at the epicenter of the
Indigenous peoples’ rights movement in international law.
Accordingly, they have invoked or claimed international human
rights—particularly free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC)—
to complicate, and perhaps destabilize, the DAPL’s
development. However, the importance of their activism is not
merely in claiming human rights.
Based upon a global map of law that involves multiple
and overlapping legalities, this article tracks the Sioux Tribe’s
activism according to the problem-solving approach.
Accordingly, the Sioux Tribe is advancing a different model of
legality, one that is not based on a top-down command and
control authority. This article reveals a complex, global network
of intercommunal Indigenous peoples and nonstate actors by
tracing the historical trajectory of the Sioux Tribe, its opposition
to the DAPL, its role in the Indigenous peoples’ rights
movement, and the novel extra-national legalities the Sioux
Tribe is helping to formalize.

*

Stephen Young is a sessional lecturer and PhD candidate in law at the
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In mid-2016, the Sioux Tribe1 initiated legal suits and
protests to prevent the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) from
crossing under Lake Oahe,2 a reservoir on the Missouri River
from which the Sioux Tribe sources its drinking water.3 The
Sioux Tribe sought to protect its water source, but its protest
aligns with broader goals, such as protecting lands, culture,
sacred sites, the environment, and rectifying past injuries.4
Crucially, as argued here, it also aligns with larger international
and transnational movements. In opposing the DAPL, the Sioux
Tribe claimed that the federal government failed to adequately
consult them or obtain consent in contravention of federal law,
treaties, and the international human rights of self-determination
and free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC).5
Although federal legal procedures may ultimately
provide the Sioux Tribe with a means for preventing continued
operation of the DAPL,6 which is currently functional, the Sioux
Tribe’s invocation of FPIC at other levels of legality has been,
to some degree, successful. It has been successful in further
formalizing networks of Indigenous peoples, human rights
advocates, nonstate, and transnational legal actors to defund and
divest from fossil fuels.7 Undoubtedly, federal law remains a
central component of Tribe-State relations.8 However, since the

1

The terms “Standing Rock Sioux Tribe” and “Sioux” are not necessarily
synonymous. Here, the term “Sioux Tribe” refers to those peoples of the
Great Sioux Nation, including the Standing Rock, Cheyenne River,
Yankton, and Crow Creek Sioux Tribes. The relation between law and tribal
signifier is examined infra section II.AI.A–B.
2
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, (Standing Rock
I), 205 F. Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016); Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, (Standing Rock II), 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C.
2017); Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, (Standing
Rock III), 255 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2017).
3
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, Background on the Dakota Access Pipeline, at
1, https://www.standingrock.org/data/upfiles/media/
Backgrounder%20DAPL%20SRST%20FINAL.pdf (webpage is no longer
active) (on file with author) [hereinafter Background on the DAPL].
4
Id. at 1 (“The Tribe opposes DAPL because we must honor our ancestors
and protect our sacred sites and our precious waters.”).
5
Steve Sitting Bear & Robert Borrero, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and IITC
File an Urgent Communication to the United Nations Citing Human Rights
Violations Resulting from Pipeline Construction, Aug. 19, 2016,
http://hosted.verticalresponse.com/1383891/95e72ee8db/545546365/b5d5e1
da0f/ [https://perma.cc/X427-T3GQ].
6
See, e.g., Standing Rock III, supra note 2.
7
Infra section V.F.
8
Supra note 1.
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early 1980s, Indigenous peoples have been developing extranational legal levels to pressure industry, nonstate actors, and
states to adopt new ways of approaching Tribe-State
interactions.9 The Sioux Tribe was at the center of this
movement,10 and this role in advancing Indigenous peoples’
rights partly explains the Tribe’s ability to generate international
attention. Appreciating the Sioux Tribe’s role in the Indigenous
peoples’ rights movement in international law also assists in
explaining why its opposition to the DAPL has been formative
for Indigenous peoples around the world. From a legal
perspective, it is important to appreciate how the Sioux Tribe,
with the support of many others, has formed and relied upon
extra-national and sub-national levels of legality to de-center the
extant statist legal regime.11
This article explains the Sioux Tribe’s opposition
according to Patrick Cottrell and David Trubek’s problemsolving approach to law in global spaces.12 Where most law
operates as “top-down control using fixed statutes, detailed rules,
and judicial enforcement,”13 Cottrell and Trubek explain that in
global spaces, “law-like processes operate more as a framework
for collective problem solving in complex and uncertain
situations.”14 When peer pressure fails to persuade states and
industry to participate in working towards resolving a common
problem, those excluded from participating may engage in more
destabilizing acts.15 The Sioux Tribe sought to participate in
resolving a common problem: who to consult and who has the

9

Infra section V.C–F.
Infra section V.C. See, e.g., Int’l Indian Treaty Council, Declaration of
Continuing Independence, June 1974, http://www.iitc.org/about-iitc/thedeclaration-of-continuing-independence-june-1974/.
11
See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON
SENSE 246–47 (2002) (NEW COMMON SENSE). Santos writes, “the nationstate has been the most central time-space of law for the last two hundred
years, particularly in the core countries of the world system. However, its
centrality only became possible because the other two time-spaces, the local
and the global, were formally declared non-existent by the hegemonic
liberal political theory.” Id. at 85.
12
See generally M. Patrick Cottrell & David M. Trubek, Law as Problem
Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, and Deliberation in Global
Space, 21 TRANS. L. & CONT. PROB. 359 (2012).
13
David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal
Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 539, 543 (2006-2007).
14
Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 359. They say “law-like” because in
many instances, the norms they are discuss are “soft-law” norms or non-topdown, command and control style legalities.
15
Id. at 374.
10
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power to participate in permitting the construction of the DAPL
on disputed territory.16 To the extent that federal and industry
actors identified problems, they were problems of permitting
solvable under federal law.17 In turning to federal law, the federal
actors ignored or minimized the territorial dispute and therein
disregarded the commonality of the problem by simply shifting
the problem to the Sioux Tribe. As argued here, the Sioux
Tribe’s exclusion from participating according to its own, or a
negotiated, participatory standard has led it to use alternative
tools to pressure federal and industry actors.18 The Sioux Tribe
has done so by invoking international human rights law and
cultivating international media attention in concert with
transnational and inter-network legalities to oppose the DAPL.
Its efforts may in time lead to destabilization of many fossil fuel
developments.19
Part Two orients the dispute in a historical context. As
argued here, the peoples known today as the “Sioux Tribe” have
organized against the DAPL as a result of its struggle against the
federal government and the resulting dispossession due to
natural resource exploitation. Importantly, this short history also
establishes that the land the DAPL crosses is disputed—a dispute
that federal and industry actors believe is either previously
solved or solvable under federal law.
Part Three then discusses state-level legality, the Sioux
Tribe’s litigation in the federal courts, and the DAPL protest.
The Sioux Tribe’s appeal to the legal system may, in time, halt
further operation of the DAPL,20 but the Sioux Tribe’s use of
legal procedures has limitations. According to federal law, the
land is no longer disputed, so legal action cannot resolve the
16

Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 18.
Id. at 37 (“this Court does not lightly countenance any depredation of
lands that hold significant to the Standing Rock Sioux. Aware of the
indignities visited upon the Tribe over the last centuries, the Court
scrutinizes the permitting process here with particular care. Having done so,
the court must nonetheless conclude that the Tribe has not demonstrated that
an injunction is warranted here.”).
18
Kristen A Carpenter & Angela R Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 102 CAL. L. REV. 173, 177
(2014) (arguing that General Assembly’s endorsement of the UNDRIP is
jurisgenerative moment for Indigenous peoples).
19
See infra section I.F.2; Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, 374.
20
Standing Rock III, supra note 2; contra Presidential Memorandum
Regarding Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline, Jan. 24, 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/24/presidentialmemorandum-regarding-construction-keystone-xl-pipeline [hereinafter
Trump Memo].
17
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underlying territorial dispute.21 Further, using federal law to
settle the land dispute further subjects the Sioux Tribe to the
federal legal regime.22 Despite these limitations, the Sioux Tribe
must engage with the legal system to contest the DAPL
development because it is the legal system under which the
permits for the DAPL are issued. However, the Sioux Tribe’s use
of multiple extra-national levels is important for revealing how
federal law is inadequate, how the Sioux Tribe engages with the
federal legal system as part of a global legal challenge, and how
Indigenous peoples are formalizing a different style of legality.
Part Four then introduces the concept of Indigenous
peoples’ FPIC, which some commentators see as a “right of
Indigenous Peoples to make free and informed decisions about
proposed large-scale projects on or near their land.”23 The key
instrument for Indigenous peoples’ rights is the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),
which contains several articles on FPIC.24 Generally, if states
recognize FPIC, then states will seek tribal consent before taking
actions that could impact tribal livelihood and territories. As
such, it appears FPIC could provide Indigenous peoples with a
means for preventing projects of which they do not approve, like
the DAPL.25 Although FPIC may appear promising, settlerstates, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, view UNDRIP as a nonbinding, aspirational
instrument, and hence they view some rights it recognizes, like
FPIC, as nonbinding.26 Another concern is that FPIC, as a
21

See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 388 (1980)
[Hereinafter Sioux Nation].
22
See infra section III.B–III.C.
23
Helen Szoke, Address at the Sustainable Mining Symposium at
Melbourne Business School, Indigenous Peoples, Community rights and
Mining: Free, Prior and Informed Consent (May 17, 2013) (on file with
author).
24
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res 61/295,
(Sept. 13, 2007) at 10, 11(2), 19, 28(1), 29(2), 32(2) (Sept. 13, 2007)
[hereinafter UNDRIP]. I assume the Standing Rock Sioux self-identify as
“Indigenous peoples” given their invocation of rights contained in UNDRIP.
For a discussion on the term “Indigenous peoples” see, e.g., KATHLEEN
BIRRELL, INDIGENEITY: BEFORE AND BEYOND THE LAW 7–24 (2016);
RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM 3–5 (2003).
25
See infra Part IV. There is a debate about whether FPIC provides
Indigenous peoples with a veto.
26
See U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107, 15; Press Release, Robert Hagen, US
advisor statement on U.S. Mission to the U. N. on the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples Assembly (Sept. 13, 2007); President of the
U.S., Remarks at the White House Tribal Nations Conference (Dec. 16,
2010); but cf, Sheryl Lightfoot, Selective Endorsement without Intent to
Implement: Indigenous Rights and the Anglosphere, 16(1) INT’L J HUM.
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summary process for granting or withholding consent, may be
too vague to operate as a binding legal standard.27 Where states
do not embrace FPIC, international instruments that recognize
FPIC lack a ‘legal’ means of resistance. Despite the failings of
the state system and the uphill battle for broader recognition of
the Indigenous peoples’ rights movement in the United States,
the Sioux Tribe’s activism reveals how it is claiming and
invoking FPIC in global legal spaces.
Part Five describes the development and use of FPIC
according to a map of law in global spaces. Settler-state
resistance to Indigenous rights has allowed Indigenous peoples
to develop means of resistance at sites of nonstate legality. To
articulate how FPIC has discursively developed throughout
multiple and overlapping legal levels, this article relies on
William Twining’s map of global law.28 From a state-centric,
positivist perspective, the extra-national levels are often
identified as ‘soft law’ or as legally nonbinding.29 Even if FPIC
is soft law, when FPIC is “operationalized” according to the
problem-solving approach in global spaces, as the Sioux Tribe
exemplify, it puts pressure on and may destabilize projects.30
This article concludes that the Sioux Tribe, along with its
intercommunal networks, is using different levels of legality in
new and novel ways that are not explainable under state-based

RTS. 100, 103, 114–15 (2012) (critical appraisal of that speech); also, James
Anaya, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights
andFundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, Promotion & Prot. of All
Human Rights, Civil, Political Economic, Social & Cultural Rights,
Including the Right to Development, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34 (July
15, 2009) [hereinafter Promotion and Protection]; U.N. General Assembly,
Meeting Record, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 11–14 (Sept. 13,
2007); Peter Vaughn, Statement of Peter Vaughn to the Permanent Forum
on Indigenous Issues, Representative of Australia, on behalf of Australia,
New Zealand and the U.S., on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (May 22,
2006); Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent:
Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights within International Law, 10(2)
NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 54, 59 (2011).
27
Robert T. Coulter, Free Prior and Informed Consent: Not the Right it is
Made Out to Be, INDIAN RES. LAW CTR. (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://indianlaw.org/sites/default/files/FPIC_RTC_Oct2013.pdf.
28
See generally WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY
139 (2000) [hereinafter GLOBALISATION]. Tamanaha has similarly argued
that there are areas of legality. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal
Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYD L. REV. 375, 397
(2008). H. Patrick Glenn wrote of co-existing different legal ‘traditions’.
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 61–98
(4th ed. 2010).
29
Infra section IV.B.
30
Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12.
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legalities or even a combination of state and international
legalities.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SIOUX TRIBE

The Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL is animated
by more than water-protection and the placement of a pipeline.
Those who are identifiable as “the Sioux Tribe” have been
forcefully dispossessed, marginalized and made precarious by
the federal government and its legal machinations. This short
history also establishes that the land involved in the DAPL
construction is disputed, despite how government and industry
actors treat the dispute as though it is resolved.
A. Who Are the Sioux?
Three distinct dialects refer to themselves as the Lakota,
Dakota, and Nakota, which comprise the “alliance of friends.”31
Together, they identify themselves as Oceti Sakowin or Seven
Council Fires.32 The Oceti Sakowin were originally from
woodland areas in modern-day Minnesota, but were forced
westward onto the plains by the Ojibwa and Cree who received
guns and ammunition from French fur traders in the seventeenth
century.33 In time, the Oceti Sakown became known to others
under the name “Sioux,” which is a linguistic bastardization of
the Ojibwa word Nadouwesou that means snakes, small adder,
or enemy.34 In the seventeenth century, French traders shortened
Nadouwesou to “Sou,” which they wrote as “Sioux.”35

31

EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIOUX NATION
VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT 4 (1991); ROBERT M.
UTLEY, THE LAST DAYS OF THE SIOUX NATION 6 (1963).
32

Oceti Sakowin Camp, History, http://www.ocetisakowincamp.org/history
(last visited July 31, 2017) (list the Seven Council Fires as the
Mdewakanton, Wahpekute, Sisitonawan/Sisseton, Wahpetonwan,
Ihanktown/Lower Yanktonai, Ihanktowana/Upper Yanktoni and Tetowan);
MICHAEL JOHNSON & JONATHAN SMITH, THE TRIBES OF THE SIOUX NATION
5 (2000).
33
UTLEY, supra note 31, at 6 (uses the word “Chippewa” another name for
the Ojibwe); LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 4–5; JOHNSON & SMITH, supra
note 32, at 4-5.
34
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, History, https://www.standingrock.org/
content/history (last visited July 31, 2017); LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 4
(“nadoueissiw”); JOHNSON & SMITH, supra note 32, at 4 (“nadowe-is-iwug”).
35
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, History, https://www.standingrock.org/
content/history (last visited July 31, 2017).
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Between the seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries,
the Sioux Tribe expanded its territories throughout the plains
regions to the extent that Edward Lazarus saw the Sioux as an
“empire.”36 During that time, each band had a chief, but the chief
was not the ruler or executive power of the band, tribe, or the
entire Oceti Sakowin. Robert Utley describes how the Oceti
Sakowin’s internal government changed because of contact with
‘whites’ in the mid-nineteenth century:
This system of tribal government operated only
during the summer months, when the bands came
together as a tribe to hunt and to make work. It
worked well enough, but when increasing
numbers of whites moved westward in the middle
nineteenth century, posing a sustained menace to
the Indian way of life, it proved too weak.
Paradoxically, the white officials injected more
authoritarianism into the system. Ignorant of the
realities of Sioux political organization, they
found it convenient to deal with a tribe through a
single leader and persuaded each tribe to choose
a head chief . . . The officials’ assumption that a
chief ruled absolutely over his people led to many
misunderstandings between the two races.37
Utley explains that those known as the “Sioux” were
already undergoing changes when, in 1849,38 prospectors
discovered gold in California, and American civilians began
flooding the Sioux Tribe’s territory.39 To ensure that settlers
would remain safe inside Indian territories, the federal
government gathered representatives from potentially affected
Tribes—including the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho—and
offered them a yearly annuity in return for the safety of American
citizens.40 This agreement was the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851,
which recognized the “Sioux” or “Dahcotah” Nation

36

LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 7.
UTLEY, supra note 31, at 10.
38
LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 7–20.
39
Id. at 15–16.
40
Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stats. 749, art. 7 (Sept. 17, 1851), [hereinafter
‘1851 Fort Laramie Treaty’] (provided an annuity of fifty thousand dollars
for fifty years, which the United States Congress changed to ten years when
ratified).
37
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territories.41 The tribal representatives were tribal chiefs who did
not rule absolutely over the Oceti Sakowin, but the federal
government considered them leaders of nations, rather than
viewing them as part of their own complex legal arrangements.42
That the Oceti Sakowin were identified as “Sioux” by midnineteenth century suggests that how others understood the
Tribe, rather than how it understood and identified itself, was
already salient.43 The 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty continued a
process of legally forming the Oceti Sakowin into the Sioux and
the Dakota by tethering them to territory.44
B. The Formation of the Great Sioux Nation and Its
Fragmentation
In the 1860s, the Civil War created a shortage of gold and
silver, which renewed American interest in resource
exploitation.45 When prospectors discovered gold in what would
become known as Montana, American civilians again flooded
into and across the Sioux Tribe’s territories. Violence between
Indian Nations and American citizens in Minnesota spilled into
the Sioux Tribe’s territory, which led to Red Cloud’s War.46 The
federal government sued for peace, which resulted in the 1868
Fort Laramie Treaty.47 In addition to temporarily ceasing
hostilities, the 1868 Treaty acknowledged lands belonging to the
Great Sioux Nation, which started on the eastern bank of the
Missouri River and encapsulated the entirety of western South

41

Id. at art. 5. (Article 4 guarantees safety of United States citizens. Article
2 guarantees a federal right to construct roads through the Tribal-Nation
lands codified by the Treaty.); see, LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 18 (claiming
the 1851 Treaty was deliberately insensitive to Sioux culture and
definitions).
42
UTLEY, supra note 31, at 10.
43
1851 Fort Laramie Treaty, supra note 40, at art. 5.
44
Treaty with the Sioux, Sept. 23, 1805 (approved by the U.S. Senate on
Apr. 16, 1808, never ratified); Treaty with the Sioux of the Lakes, July 19,
1815, 7 Stat., 126., Ratified Dec. 26, 1815; Treaty with the Sioux of St.
Peter’s River, July 19, 1815., 7 Stat., 127. Ratified Dec. 26, 1815; Treaty
with the Sioux, June 1, 1816, 7 State., 143, Proclamation, Dec. 30, 1816;
Treaty with the Teton, Etc., Sioux, June 22, 1825, 7 Stat., 250,
Proclamation, Feb. 6, 1825; Treaty with the Sioux, Etc., Aug. 19, 1825, 7
Stat., 272, Proclamation Feb. 6, 1826. Those treaties do not signify the
Sioux as a singular unity as would the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty.
45
LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 26–30.
46
Id.
47
Treaty of Fort Laramie, 15 Stat. 635, (Apr. 29, 1868) [hereinafter ‘1868
Fort Laramie Treaty’].
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Dakota.48 Article XII specified that “at least three-fourth of all
the adult male Indians occupying or interest[ed] in the” land
must consent to abrogate any article or cede territory.49 The 1868
Treaty formed the Sioux or Dahcotah Nations into the Great
Sioux Nation, as it further leashed that legal identification to a
particular territory.
The cessation of hostilities generated by the 1868 Fort
Laramie Treaty would not last. The United States would soon
trigger violence and would never obtain the consent of threefourths of the Great Sioux Nation’s adult male population.
Following rumors of gold in the Black Hills, General George
Custer entered the Great Sioux Nation territory to confirm the
rumors.50 When the presence of gold was confirmed, the federal
government attempted to purchase the Black Hills, which the
Great Sioux Nation rejected.51 The federal government then
adopted an unofficial policy of encouraging illegal prospecting
in the Black Hills.52 Again, American settlers flooded into the
Sioux Tribe’s territory, this time with the intent to mine, which
led to the Great Sioux War and the most infamous Native
American/United States conflict, the Battle of Little Bighorn.53
After Sitting Bull and other native leaders soundly defeated
General Custer, the tides of war turned against the Great Sioux
Nation. Despite the 1868 Treaty specifying that “at least threefourths of all the adult male Indians occupying or interest[ed] in
the [land]” would have to sign away land rights, in 1877 a United
States Commission forced the Sioux to cede the Black Hills,
obtaining signatures from only ten percent of the Sioux Nation’s
adult male population.54 In 1980, the United States Supreme
48

Id. arts. II, X, XI (also guaranteed large amounts of land for hunting
outside the reservation; and subsistence rations until 1872).
49
Id. art. XII.
50
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 371, 376–77.
51
Id. at 379.
52
John P. LaVelle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice
by Restoring the Great Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to
the Great Sioux Nation, 5 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 40, 45 n. 27 (2001)
citing Exhibits in Appendix C To Reply Brief of Sioux Nation in Court of
Claims No. 148–78, reprinted in Appendix Accompanying Brief of
Respondent Sioux Nation at 59; Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 371 (reprinted
letter from Lt. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, commander of the Military Div. of
the Missouri, to Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, commander of the Dep’t of
Dakota, Nov. 9, 1875).
53
The federal government re-named the Sioux “hostiles.” Sioux Nation, 448
U.S. at 379; LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 74.
54
Acts of Forty-Fourth Congress, Second Session, Feb. 28, 1877 Ch. 72,
Art. 1, 19 Stat. 254; Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 381–82; LaVelle, supra note
52, at 51–54; LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 90–2.
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Court would later agree with the Sioux Nation that the federal
government’s actions in the Black Hills contravened the 1868
Treaty.55 However, in 1877, the Great Sioux Nation was
powerless to prevent the United States from taking legal
ownership.56
Amidst these exercises in overt violence, the federal
government adopted a new tactic.57 The federal government
decided to regulate tribes and Indian Nations, including the Great
Sioux Nation, by passing domestic legislation, rather than
continuing to enter into treaties.58 The following 1887 General
Allotment Act, also called the “Dawes Act,” sought to assimilate
Native Americans into American society.59 It partitioned
territories held by tribes or bands into alienable property rights
for families.60 Where the 1851 and 1868 Laramie Treaties
centralized and formalized the Great Sioux Nation, the
subsequent Sioux Act of 1889 broke the Great Sioux Nation into
five separate and fragmented reservations, one of which is the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.61 The Sioux Act of 1889 also
claimed title to the land upon which the federal government
would later build the Oahe dam.
C. Twentieth-century Developments
In 1934, the United States Congress passed the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA), also called the “Indian New Deal.”62
The IRA did not diminish the size of the Standing Rock or
Cheyenne River Reservations, but it set the stage for natural

55

Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 423–24.
LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 90–2.
57
See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED 15 (Mauro
Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans. (2003) (“politics is
the continuation of war by other means”). Foucault’s statement reverses
Karl von Clausewitz’s dictum that war is “the continuation of policy by
other means.” KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, WAR POLITICS AND POWER 83
(1967).
58
25 U.S.C. § 71 (1871) (claims that “no obligation of any treaty lawfully
made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March 3,
1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.”).
59
General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388, Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 25 U.S.C.A.
311.
60
Id. §§ 5, 7.
61
An act to divide a portion of the reservation of the Sioux Nation of
Indians in Dakota into separate reservations and to secure the
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resource exploitation to do so.63 After World War II, the federal
government began damming its major river systems, including
the Missouri River, to generate hydroelectric power.64 The Oahe
Dam’s construction on the Missouri River in the late 1950s and
early 1960s created Lake Oahe,65 which forcefully displaced
members of the Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribes.66 Lake Oahe flooded 160,889 acres of the most densely
forested and resource-rich Sioux lands, which resulted in the
single largest public works destruction of Indian land.67 Again,
American desire for natural resources dispossessed the Oceti
Sakowin.
The Sioux Tribe’s members were actively resisting
throughout the 1960s and 1970s68 and won a significant Supreme
Court case in 1980. Justice Blackmun and seven Justices agreed
with the Sioux Nation that the federal government had illegally
taken the Black Hills in contravention of the 1868 Treaty.69
Although the Sioux Nation sought to have the Black Hills
63

The National Industrial Recovery Act created the Public Works
Administration, which would initiate the nationwide dam infrastructure
projects. MICHAEL J. LAWSON JR., DAMMED INDIANS: THE PICK-SLOAN
PLAN AND THE MISSOURI RIVER SIOUX, 1944-1980 11–12 (1994).
64
Pick-Sloan Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. 78-534, Dec. 22, 1944, 58
Stat. 887. For a detailed chronicle of the planning for the dam, its effect on
the Sioux and their resistance, see generally LAWSON, supra note 63. The
1953 House Concurrent Resolution 108 officially commenced termination,
which sought to end the trustee relationship and have Indians accept
American citizenship. For a general account of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s
resistance to termination see EDWARD CHARLES VALANDRA, NOT WITHOUT
OUR CONSENT: LAKOTA RESISTANCE TO TERMINATION, 1950–59 (2006).
65
An Act to designate the Oahe Reservoir on the Missouri River in the States
of North Dakota and South Dakota as Lake Oahe, H.R. 2901, Mar. 21, 1968,
Pub. L. 90-270 (named Lake Oahe “in honor of the Indian people who
inhabited the great Missouri River Basin”).
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LAWSON, supra note 63, at xx-xxi. The Standing Rock Sioux received
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reservation. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjust Act of 1992
Title XXXV, Pub. L. 102-575.
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developments described infra section V.C.
69
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 371, 434–45 (Rehnquist dissenting).

185

returned to it, Blackmun ordered just compensation and
interest.70 Out of fear that accepting the money would abrogate
the 1868 Treaty, the Sioux Tribe never accepted the money,
leaving it to sit in a Bureau of Indian Affairs bank account.71 The
Sioux Nation maintains that the land is legally and morally
theirs.72 In 2012, the United Nations (U.N.) Special Rapporteur
on the rights of Indigenous peoples James Anaya’s report on
Indigenous peoples in the United States highlighted the Sioux
Tribe’s dispossession.73 In that report, Anaya noted the
inadequately controlled development of extractive industries
over Indian land,74 and called upon the federal government to
redress treaty violations and non-consensual taking by returning
traditional lands to Indian control.75 In making these points,
Anaya singled out the taking of the Black Hills as a paradigm
case that “serve[s] as a constant visible reminder of their loss.”76
This all-too-brief brief history contextualizes the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s recent opposition to the DAPL.77
Its opposition is about an oil pipeline under Lake Oahe near
Standing Rock Reservation. But it is neither a simple dispute nor
solely about a pipeline. For at least 160 years, natural resource
demands combined with legal machinations and no small
amount of subterfuge, transformed the Oceti Sakowin’s empire
into the Sioux or Dahcotah Nation, the Great Sioux Nation, and
then the various reservation-based Sioux Tribes. According to
the 1868 Treaty, the Great Sioux Nation owns the land beginning
on the eastern bank of the Missouri River, which includes the
lands upon which the Oahe dam was constructed and Lake Oahe
now floods. The Sioux Tribe maintains that Treaty is still in full
effect.78 If it appears that the Sioux Tribe has been buffeted about
70
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More recent developments by the Sioux Tribe in the late twentieth century
is provided infra Part V.
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Although the Supreme Court found that the United States contravened the
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claim. See United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 39, 49 (1985); Julie Ann
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by the whims of the federal government, that is not necessarily
the case.79 The following explains how the Tribe has continued
to actively resist in ways that lawyers might overlook.
III.

THE SIOUX TRIBE’S OPPOSITION TO THE DAPL

This section focuses on the struggles at the federal level
of legality. In the following sections, it is argued that a full
analysis of the Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL should be
analyzed according to a broader, nonstate-centric perspective,
rather than one that focuses narrowly on the federal level of
legality. The Sioux Tribe sought to participate in resolving
common problems—including how to consult and who has the
power to participate in permitting the DAPL over disputed
territory—by
requesting
government-to-government
80
consultation. To the extent that federal government and
industry actors saw a problem, it was a problem of permitting,
which they saw as solvable according to federal law.81 In turning
to federal law, federal government and industry actors continued
dealing with the Sioux Tribe according to domestic law,82 as
opposed to engaging in government-to-government relations.83
For Cottrell and Trubek, a state-based hierarchical
approach to legality conforms to “[c]lassical theories of law
[which] stress the importance of substantive norms, with
procedure seen simply as a tool for ensuring compliance with
these norms.”84 They explain that “[c]ollective problem solving
involves a common understanding that a problem exists,
consensus that it ought to be solved, and the mobilization of
appropriate expertise and resource to do so.”85 Instead of
“creating a framework for the construction of new knowledge”

Rights, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 52 (2007). Indicative of
the federal government’s policy towards Tribes, the federal government
accepted the money from itself on behalf of the Shoshone, thereby
extinguishing the Shoshone’s claim. See also Standing Rock III, supra note
1, at 131 (“Standing Rock believes that the Corps’ position “misunderstands
the Tribe’s Treaty rights,” which “embody the fundamental right of a people
tied to a place since time immemorial” and thus demand a more
“existential” analysis.”).
79
See supra notes 66, 69 and accompanying text; also infra Part V.
80
Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 9–10, 18–19; see infra sections III.B–C.
81
Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 19.
82
Consistent with 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1871), supra note 58.
83
There are various interpretations of “government-to-government”. See
infra sections III.B–C.
84
Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 368.
85
Id. at 367.
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and “promoting participation” to “translate knowledge into
norms” that would guide future behavior and compliance about
how to proceed,86 the permitting federal agency and pipeline
developer federal law, which further excluded and marginalized
the Sioux Tribe. In adhering to the federal legal standards, the
federal government and pipeline developer simply denied the
existence of a common problem to be resolved. In response, the
Sioux Tribe has used “moral suasion, the potential for public
embarrassment, and reputation costs” to either “retain quality
participation” or generate a “penalty default and a destabilization
regime.”87
In effect, the Sioux Tribe used multiple levels of legality
and effectively mobilized federal law as one legal tool to oppose
the project.88 Consider first the applicable federal law, what
consultation processes were undertaken by the federal
government and pipeline developer, the legal dispute, and
finally, the protest. The Sioux Tribe has successfully used United
States legal mechanisms to its advantage.89 It has also used
legality in global spaces, more recent developments of a different
kind of legality that may mitigate the more pernicious effects of
United States law on tribes.90
A. The Applicable Federal Law
Dakota Access, LLC, a subsidiary of Energy Transfer
Crude Oil Company, is the entity developing the DAPL.91 The
DAPL is a 1,172-mile long pipeline that would transport crude
oil from the fields near Stanley, North Dakota to Patoka,
Illinois.92 Most of the pipeline, around 99% of it, traverses
private land, which does not require permitting.93 The DAPL
only requires federal permitting where it crosses federally
regulated lands and waters, including Lake Oahe.94 As such, the
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Energy Transfer Partners, The Route, http://landowners.
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agency responsible for permitting, the United States Army Corps
of Engineers (Corps), only has permitting and regulatory
jurisdiction over 1% of the DAPL. The thorny issue is that
according to the 1868 Treaty, the land starting on the eastern
bank of the Missouri River, which is now the eastern boundary
of Lake Oahe, belongs to the Great Sioux Nation.95
Under the 1868 Treaty, the federal government cannot do
anything with that land without the consent of three-quarters of
the the Sioux Nation’s adult male population.96 Furthermore,
under the 1851 Treaty, the DAPL cuts through the northernmost
portion of the Sioux Tribe’s territory. As such, the Sioux Tribe
might maintain jurisdiction (from its legal perspective) over
lands the federal government regulates as private property, as
well as territory starting on the east bank of the Missouri River,
which is now the boundary of Lake Oahe. For its part, Dakota
Access, LLC, claims, “[t]he Dakota Access Pipeline Does Not
Cross Land Owned by the Standing Rock Sioux.”97 While true
under extant federal law, it is inaccurate according to the 1868
Treaty, the 1851 Treaty, and perhaps, the Sioux Tribe’s view of
land ownership.98 Hence, Dakota Access, LLC, and the Corps
claim they complied with federal law and provided the Sioux
opportunities for consultation, but the Sioux were unwilling to
engage in meaningful consultation.99 Within federal court, the
controversy was whether the federal government applied its own
legal standards in permitting the project, not whether conflicting
jurisdictional claims arose under the Treaties.100 An overview of
federal law is required to understand the ways in which the
View/Article/749823/frequently-asked-questions-dapl/ (last visited July 31,
2017).
95
1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, supra note 47.
96
Id. at art XII.
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2017).
98
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99
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2016), at 5, Standing Rock I, supra note 2.
100
The Sioux Tribe’s initial legal challenge was principally on National
Historic Preservation Act grounds as opposed to National Environmental
Policy Act grounds. Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 7; cf. Standing Rock
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Corps, Dakota Access, LLC, and the Sioux Tribe adopt different
approaches to legality.
The DAPL was planned to cross under Lake Oahe, a
reservoir on the Missouri River. According to federal law, the
Missouri River is a United States navigable waterway, and thus
the Clean Water Act,101 the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,102
and the National Environmental Policy Act103 (NEPA) apply. To
comply with NEPA, an agency must complete an environmental
assessment (EA); and if the EA generates a finding of no
significant impact, then an environmental impact statement
(EIS) does not need to be completed. The National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA) also applies because there may be
Tribal historic sites on the land involved, which would require
consultation with tribes in some circumstances under Section
106.104 Lastly, National Permit 12 is a national streamlined
infrastructure permitting scheme, which applies because the
DAPL is regulated as infrastructure.105 Essentially, as long as the
Corps satisfies the requirements of NHPA and NEPA, then
Nationwide Permit 12 enables the Corps to grant Dakota Access,
LLC an easement for the DAPL’s construction under Lake Oahe.
Additional complicating legal features are Executive
Orders or Executive Memorandums, which influence how
federal agencies operate. For example, Executive Order 13,175
directs federal agencies to “meaningfully consult” with tribes.106
101

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
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President Obama’s memorandum regarding Executive Order
13,175 directs federal agencies to engage in regular and
meaningful consultation and collaboration with tribes involving
action taken on federal lands when that action impacts tribal
interests.107 Michael Eitner has argued that even if it appears
laudatory, the standard for meeting “meaningful consultation”
remains elusive and inadequate.108 The importance of Executive
Order 13,175 to the DAPL project may have been altered by
President Trump’s Executive Memorandum on the DAPL,109
which sought to advance its permitting.
Although the Sioux Tribe has challenged the Corps’
compliance with NHPA and NEPA, the heart of the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL is a failure of the
federal government to consult and obtain its consent.110 The
Sioux Tribe has turned to federal law, but the dispute in federal
legal space is one level in a dispute that involves legalities in
global spaces, including nonstate, intercommunal, international,
regional, and transnational legalities.
To satisfy the NHPA and NEPA, the Corps and Dakota
Access, LLC contacted Sioux Tribe leaders and cultural heritage
officers between 2014 and 2016.111 In the Sioux Tribe’s suits
against the Corps and Dakota Access, LLC, United States
District Court Judge Boasberg interpreted the Sioux Tribe’s
requests for consultation according to federal legal standards,
which is of course what a United States District Court Judge
must do. Reading those opinions through the lens of a United
fulfil the federal government’s trust responsibility to tribes); Michael Eitner,
Meaningful Consultation with Tribal Governments: A Uniform Standard to
Guarantee that Federal Agencies Properly Consider their Concerns, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. 867, 885–89 (2014).
107
Barack Obama, Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the
Heads of Executive Department and Agencies Regarding Tribal
Consultation (Nov. 5, 2009).
108
Eitner, supra note 106, at 885–94. Eitner argues it falls short of the
United States’ trust responsibility to tribes because the standard of
“meaningful consultation” is determined by each agency and Executive
Orders do not provide a substantive cause of action if the agency does not
engage in meaningful consultation with a tribe. Trust responsibility stems
from Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (“the Indians . . .
may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations.
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will,
which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the
United State resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”).
109
Trump Memo, supra note 20.
110
Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 7; Standing Rock III, supra note 2, at
111; Sitting Bear & Borrero, supra note 5.
111
Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 13–24.
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States lawyer or judge is what Cottrell and Trubek call a “strictly
legalist approach.”112 This approach “emphasize[s] command
and control regulation in which courts and similar bodies that
apply sanctions for noncompliance lay down and enforce
relatively specific rules that define allowable behavior.”113
Reading the DAPL dispute in that way misses that the
territory in question “consists of multiple overlapping legal
orders that transcend conventional state boundaries and bring
many more participant actors into the regulatory arena.”114 Even
if the Sioux Tribe is requesting that the courts uphold federal law
in a broad manner, it is also asking to be consulted as an
independent government that has unique insight and knowledge
about the land (and its relationship to that land).115 Despite the
Sioux Tribe’s bids to share information and work towards
solving a territorial dispute, the Corps, Dakota Access, LLC, and
the federal courts have strictly adhered to federal law and thus
refuse to acknowledge the multiple and overlapping legal orders.
Given jurisdictional limitations, the Corps and federal
courts are likely unable to consider those other legal orders. In
adhering to federal law, the Corps and the courts reveal their
inability to adequately treat complex historical issues, such as
the Sioux Tribe’s desire for consultation in this situation. The
following summarizes District Court Judge Boasberg’s findings
about the consultation processes.
B. The Attempt to Consult?
Beginning in 2014 and early 2015, the Corps and Dakota
Access, LLC contacted the Sioux Tribe about the planning for
the DAPL regarding their initial NHPA finding of “no historic
properties affected.”116 After not hearing from the Sioux Tribe,
the Corps “green-lighted the work” and only then received a
letter from the Sioux Tribe requesting consultation.117 In 2015, a
series of communications were traded between the Corps and
various members of the Sioux Tribe’s government, including the
former Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Chairman Archambault.118
112
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The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Tribal Historic Preservation
Officer, a position designated by the NHPA, wrote that the
“Tribe looked forward to participating in future consultation
prior to any work being completed . . . [and] to playing a primary
role in any and all survey work and monitoring.”119 While one
could read it as a request for the Corps or Dakota Access, LLC
to comply with federal law, broader contextualization reveals a
request for the State and industry to consult with the Tribe and
treat it as an independent government, one with a primary role in
supervising the project.120 Subsequent exchanges further reveal
a divergence in legal approaches.
The Corps then requested a meeting with members of the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. Tribe members responded, “after
careful consideration . . . it is in the best interest . . . to decline
participation in the site visits and walking the project corridor’s
[area of projected effects] at this time until government-togovernment consultation has occurred for this project per
[NHPA] Section 106 requirements as requested by the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe.”121 Judge Boasberg narrowly interpreted the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s request as “mean[ing] that the
Corps needed to first hold the previously requested meeting
between Chairman Archambault and Colonel Henderson [of the
Corps].”122 In doing so, Judge Boasberg reduces “governmentto-government” or sovereign-to-sovereign discussion to
government-representative-authorized-to-permit-the-project-tochairman or government-to-subject discussion. It could appear,
as it did to Judge Boasberg, as though NHPA Section 106 is a
direction to the Corps to gather information from potentially
affected tribes. The Sioux Tribe’s request for government-togovernment consultation, however, suggests a broader view of
Section 106, something akin to a meeting between more equal
sovereign actors.
Under NHPA Section 106, Judge Boasberg found that
the Corps and members of the Tribe had “no fewer than seven
meetings” between January and May 2016, including meetings
to increase safety standards for constructing the pipeline under
Lake Oahe.123 In early 2016, Dakota Access, LLC offered to
conduct cultural surveys with several tribes, including the
119
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Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, to understand the cultural
significance of the area.124 The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
declined to participate, citing the survey’s limited scope, and
“urged the Corps to redefine the area of potential effect to
include the entire pipeline and asserted that it would send no
experts to help identity cultural resources until this occurred.”125
It might appear that the Sioux Tribe members are not
willing to participate in consultation. However, given the
ongoing territorial dispute, the Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the
survey is not a simple unwillingness to participate. It appears as
an unwillingness to be further subjected to a standard dictated by
federal law. Judge Boasberg found that the Corps responded and
explained that it did not “regulate or oversee the construction of
pipelines, and [its] regulatory control is limited to only a small
portion of the land and waterways that the pipeline traverses.”126
One could read the dispute, as Judge Boasberg did, as a conflict
in the interpretation of federal law, where the Corps is simply
explaining that it has a minimal role to play in the DAPL
permitting.127 On the other hand, it could be that the Sioux Tribe
were maintaining its jurisdiction and knowledge over the area
involved while resisting the imposition of federal law.
Judge Boasberg noted that members of the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe visited Lake Oahe in March 2016 and pointed
out areas of concern, which the Corps decided were outside the
area of potential impact.128 Even if the pipeline construction
would not “disturb those sites,” the Corps and Judge Boasberg
seemed to miss that any use of the land the Sioux Tribe had not
approved would be incommensurate with its approach and
understanding of the disputed lands.
The Corps then determined that the project had “no
historic properties subject to effect” under the NHPA.129
Members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe objected.130 Shortly
afterwards, the NHPA Advisory Council sent letters to the Corps
questioning both the “no effect” determination and why the
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Corps was facing problems consulting with the Sioux Tribe.131
In July 2016, the Corps attempted to finalize the DAPL
permitting by publicly releasing a NEPA EA finding of no
significant impact.132 The Standing Rock and Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribes initiated a lawsuit against the Corps and Dakota
Access, LLC seeking an injunction against the granting of an
easement for the DAPL.133 Around the same time the Sioux
Tribe filed the lawsuit, it began cultivating international
attention for its DAPL protest. The following two subsections
describe the legal dispute and then the DAPL protest.
C. The Legal Disputes
The Sioux Tribe has pursued several rounds of legal
challenges.134 First, when the Corps released its EA and moved
towards issuing a permit for the DAPL, the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (collectively the
Tribe) filed suit, claiming a failure to consult under Nationwide
Permit 12, the Clean Water Act, the Rivers and Harbors Act, and
the NHPA.135 At that time, the Tribe only sought a preliminary
injunction on NHPA grounds rather than pursuing an
environmental claim under NEPA.136 While waiting for a ruling
on the injunction, Dakota Access, LLC bulldozed an area the
Tribe claimed was of historical significance to its people.137 The
bulldozing inflamed the protest but had little impact on the legal
claim.
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Judge Boasberg denied the Tribe’s injunction, finding
that the Corps “has likely complied with the NHPA and that the
Tribe has not shown it will suffer injury that would be prevented
by any injunction.”138 On the same day of the decision and likely
in response to the protest, the Department of Justice, Department
of Army, and Department of Interior issued a joint statement that
halted permitting over Indian lands until they reviewed their
approaches to tribal consultation.139
One month after Judge Boasberg’s ruling and in response
to the protest, the Corps delayed granting the easement around
Lake Oahe because it “determined that additional discussion and
analysis [were] warranted in light of the history of the Great
Sioux Nation’s dispossessions of lands, the importance of Lake
Oahe to the Tribe, our government-to-government relationship,
and the statute governing easements through government
property.”140
That statement treats “government-to-government” in a
way that is closer to that urged by the Sioux Tribe. It is more
robustly used than Judge Boasberg’s interpretation of NHPA
Section 106.141 The following day, Dakota Access, LLC filed
suit against Corps, claiming that it had all permits required under
federal law.142 Dakota Access, LLC claimed, “[t]he much
preferred course would have been for political interference not
to have created such costly delay in the completion of a mere
formality. That would have avoided the need to burden this
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Court with a legal dispute[.]”143 The line between political
pressure and legal standard may appear obvious under what
Cottrell and Trubek call a “strictly legalist approach” to federal
law.144 It is not so obvious when considering historical injustices
or the “multiple overlapping legal orders that transcend
conventional state boundaries.”145
On December 4, 2016, the Corps announced it would
consider the viability of alternative routes for the pipeline by
engaging in an EIS under NEPA.146 Media outlets hailed the
Corps’ announcement as a “major win” and a “victory” for the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.147 Despite the laudatory language,
soon after taking office President Trump issued an Executive
Memorandum directing the Corps to reconsider the effectiveness
of its EA.148 The Department of Army then terminated the EIS,
and the Corps granted an easement for the pipeline in early
February 2017.149 By March, the DAPL was operational.150 In
response, the Sioux Tribe initiated a second round of legal
challenges.
In the second round, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
challenged the sufficiency of review under the NEPA with
specific regard to the Sioux Tribe’s 1851 Treaty rights
implicating water, hunting, and fishing.151 The Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe argued that the Treaty rights should be understood
as “rights which embody the fundamental rights of a people tied
143
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to a place since time immemorial and thus demand a more
existential analysis.”152 That claim is couched in language that is
familiar to the international human rights claims that Indigenous
peoples have been cultivating, which is discussed below.153 For
his part, Judge Boasberg found that the Tribe “offer[ed] no case
law, statutory provisions, regulations or other authority to
support its position that NEPA require[d] such a sweeping
analysis.”154 Even if Judge Boasberg is complying with federal
law to uphold the Treaty,155 that level of legality subjects the
Treaty and the Tribe to domestic regulation, therein reinforcing
the government-to-subject operation of federal law.
The court found that the Corps had sufficiently
considered the Tribe’s Treaty rights, but on a narrower issue,
“did not adequately consider the impacts of an oil spill on fishing
rights, hunting rights, or environmental justice, or the degree to
which the pipeline’s effects are likely to be highly
controversial.”156 At that time, Judge Boasberg did not rule on
whether the pipeline must cease operation or what steps the
Corps must undergo to establish the sufficiency of the EA for
Lake Oahe.157 The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe argued that
vacatur was the appropriate remedy, but the court acknowledged
it had discretion to not vacate an EA if the Corps can substantiate
its decision on remand.158 With regard to additional consultation
claims brought by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Judge
Boasberg found “that the Corps complied with its statutory
responsibilities,”159 which is a holding that reduces governmentto-government consultation to a government-to-subject act.
The second case could be considered another “major
win” for the Sioux Tribe,160 but it did not end the underlying
152
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political controversy, the territorial dispute. To a limited degree,
the Sioux Tribe has achieved success in the federal legal system.
However, in asking the court to adjudicate its claims according
to the federal legal system, the Sioux Tribe subjects itself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Even if Judge Boasberg treats all parties
as equal before the law, he must interpret the Tribe’s Treaties
according to federal law rather than act as a neutral arbiter
between two sovereign actors.
When the Sioux Tribe sought to participate in resolving
a common problem—how to consult and who has the power to
participate in permitting the DAPL over disputed territory161—
the federal government and industry actors saw the problem as
solvable according to federal law162 because federal law
regulates permitting of those sections of the DAPL. But in using
federal law to solve the permitting problem, they ignored the
territorial dispute and therein disregarded the commonality of the
problem. To the extent the Sioux Tribe maintains that there is a
common problem to resolve, the Sioux Tribe’s exclusion from
participating according to its own or a negotiated participatory
standard has led it to use alternative tools.163
For these reasons, the Sioux Tribe’s multiple rounds of
litigation should be viewed from a larger framework of legal
struggle. Accordingly, the Sioux Tribe’s use of the federal legal
system can be viewed as a tactical way to delay and perhaps
destabilize the DAPL by raising expenses. That does not mean it
is acting in bad-faith or using the legal system in an illegal
manner. The protest, which was coextensive with the litigation,
links the federal legal system to the multiple and overlapping
levels of legality.
D. The Protest
Coextensive with the Sioux Tribe’s lawsuit, it
established protest camps named Sacred Stone Camp and Oceti
Sakowin to cultivate international attention by occupying
disputed territories.164 Protesters invoked national and
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/06/dakota-accessstanding-rock-sioux-victory-court/530427/ [https://perma.cc/V78A-TL6K].
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international legal standards, and in doing so, whether
intentionally or not, formalized networks of opposition.
In a national media opinion-editorial, Chairman
Archambault explained the Tribe’s opposition according to
federal law:
Although federal law requires the Corps of
Engineers to consult with the tribe about its
sovereign interests, permits for the project were
approved and construction began without
meaningful consultation. The Environmental
Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior
and the National Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation supported more protection of the
tribe’s cultural heritage, but the Corps of
Engineers and Energy Transfer Partners turned a
blind eye to our rights.165
Scholars have elsewhere discussed the legal meaning of
“meaningful consultation.”166 It is noteworthy that Chairman
Archambault used national media to name the Corps and Energy
Transfer Partners, Dakota Access, LLC’s parent company, as
part of the name-and-blame aspect of the protest. The Sioux
Tribe’s members successfully mobilized media attention as part
of a tactic to destabilize the DAPL project.
At the international legal level, the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe decried a failure of the federal government and Dakota
Access, LLC to consult and seek its consent, as required by the
1851 and 1868 Treaties and FPIC, and recognized in
international human rights law.167 Steve Sitting Bear and
Roberto Borrero wrote,

Water, (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.commondreams.org/newswire/
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[t]he Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the
International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) jointly
submitted an urgent action communication to
four United Nations human rights Special
Rapporteurs . . . The joint urgent UN
communication requests the intervention of these
UN human rights mandate holders to call upon
the United States to uphold its statutory, legal,
Treaty and human rights obligations and impose
an immediate and ongoing moratorium on all
pipeline construction until Treaty and human
rights of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe,
including their right to free prior and informed
consent, can be ensured.168
By invoking international human rights law, the
protestors drew significant support from actors in nonstate
regulatory spaces, including U.N. Special Rapporteurs and the
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.169 Between August and
December 2016, nonstate actors (NSAs) like Cultural Survival,
Amnesty International, as well as other tribes, began to draw
attention to the protest through social and conventional media.170
The Corps enumerated those factors as complicating the DAPL’s
development, along with factors that would not appear as legal
acts, such as visits by “Hollywood A-Listers,” like Jesse
Jackson, and over a million Facebook “Check-In’s” at the
Standing Rock Sioux.171 The Sioux Tribe’s ability to cultivate
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support from NSAs and to use social media fueled significant
global interest in the protest.
In December 2016, friction between protestors and
police increased, resulting in violence and arrests.172 The
protestors blamed the police for unnecessary use of violence,
while the police blamed the protesters for inciting violence.173
Concerned with allegations of human rights abuses, the U.N. and
Amnesty International sent human right monitors to Standing
Rock.174 In response to violence, Colonel Henderson announced
the creation of “free speech zones” to move the protest site away
from the pipeline construction area, ostensibly an area that would
protect the protestors.175 He claimed the move was to “protect
the general public from violent confrontations between
protesters and law enforcement officials that have occurred in
this area, and to prevent death, illness, or serious injury to
inhabitants of encampments due to the harsh North Dakota
winter conditions.”176 Colonel Henderson announced that
anyone remaining at the protest site on December 5, 2016, would
be considered a trespasser, arrested, and prosecuted.177
Chairman Archambault responded that the tribe was
“deeply disappointed” but provided no indication whether the
Tribe would comply with Henderson’s mandate.178 On
December 4, 2016, amid increasing international pressure and no
sign that the Sioux Tribe or its supporters intended to comply
with the mandate, the Corps announced they would engage in an
172
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EIS under NEPA to consider the viability of alternative routes
for the pipeline.179 Although media outlets hailed the
announcement as a “major win” and a “victory” for the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe.180 The enthusiasm was short-lived as
President Trump directed the Corps to review and reconsider the
feasibility of the original EA and Dakota Access, LLC’s original
plan for the DAPL.181
In protesting the DAPL, the Sioux Tribe has established
important precedent which cannot be found in United States
courts. Instead, its United States-based legal strategy and protest
worked towards formalizing networks in global spaces for
operating Indigenous peoples’ FPIC.182 The next sections will
consider how the Sioux Tribe invoked FPIC, which may prevent
the DAPL from continuing to operate. Under this view, the Sioux
Tribe’s suits under national law delay and increase costs, and, as
examined below, encouraged international finance institutions
(IFIs) to divest from the DAPL. The delay-and-divestment
strategy may, in time, destabilize plans to continue operating the
DAPL by shifting investment away from fossil fuels. The Sioux
Tribe’s actions suggest that natural resource developers can no
longer ignore Indigenous peoples and their intercommunal
networks, which have created and are invoking FPIC.
IV.

INTRODUCTION TO FREE, PRIOR,
AND INFORMED CONSENT

The basic idea of FPIC is that states should seek
Indigenous consent before taking actions that will impact them,
their territories, or their livelihoods.183 Several articles of the
UNDRIP, a human rights instrument endorsed by the U.N.
General Assembly and all member states, including the United
States, recognize FPIC.184 The U.N. Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues defined FPIC as:
179
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•
•

•

•

Free should imply no coercion, intimidation
or manipulation.
Prior should imply that consent has been
sought sufficiently in advance of any
authorization or commencement of activities
and that respect is shown for time
requirements of the process.
Informed should imply that information is
provided that covers (at least): the nature,
size, pace, reversibility and scope of any
proposed project and/or activity; the reason(s)
for or purpose(s) of the project and/or
activity; the duration of the above; the locality
of areas that will be affected; a preliminary
assessment of the likely economic, social,
cultural and environmental impact, including
potential risks and fair and equitable benefitsharing in a context that respects the
precautionary principles; personnel likely to
be involved in the execution of the proposed
project (including indigenous peoples, private
sector staff, research institutions, government
employees, and others); and procedures that
the project may entail.
Consent.185

FPIC requires an exchange and understanding of
significant information, and the Indigenous community must
consent before the proposed action may commence. Nicholas
Fromherz, when comparing FPIC to federal consultation laws,
has argued that federal consultation provisions under NEPA fall
short of meeting an FPIC standard.186 Similarly, Akilah
and endorsed UNDRIP in 2009. Anaya & Puig, supra note 90, at 14 (seeing
the “veto power” as a challenge to the classical liberal framework because it
is counter-majoritarian, at least as articulated in the Inter-American Court of
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Kinnison points out that Executive Order 13,175’s meaningful
consultation standard does not guarantee that Native Americans
can provide or withhold their consent.187 As an international
human rights standard, FPIC suggests that if Indigenous peoples
do not consent, then the project should not go forward even if
national laws allow it.188 But, as commonly understood, FPIC
has two problems.
A. FPIC’s Definition
First, there is an ongoing debate over the meaning of
FPIC. The confusion results from trying to “operationalize”
FPIC as a top-down style of legality. Robert T. Coulter charges
that it “is so poorly defined (or not defined at all) that it is
189
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practically useless.”190 The U.N. Expert Mechanism on the Right
of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), which completed a two-year
study on Indigenous participation, demonstrates this confusion.
The EMRIP study stated, “[a]lthough a relatively new concept
internationally, free, prior and informed consent is one of the
most important principles, as a right, that Indigenous peoples
believe can further protect their right to participation.”191
EMRIP’s statement belies incredible complexity and confusion
from a strict legalistic perspective. For instance, one might see
FPIC as a “most important principle” that guides the
interpretation of a legally operable right. Or it might be “right”
with correlative duties and obligations if applied as a rule of law.
Or it might be a principle or a right used to protect a “further . .
. right to participation,”192 which is a confusing mixture of right
and animating principle. Additionally, EMRIP’s phrasing
190
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suggests that even if “Indigenous peoples believe” in it, others
may not.
From a strict legalistic approach it is not clear if FPIC is
a right, a principle, or perhaps something else, such as a process
that enables Indigenous peoples to give or withhold consent. If
it is not clear what FPIC is, as a right to be claimed or a process
the State is supposed to institute, then it is not clear how it is
supposed to “operate” or be put into practice.193 The conceptual
confusion leads Coulter to conclude that FPIC is little more than
“a noun with redundant intensifiers.”194 To be sure, FPIC’s
definitional imprecision signifies that it is soft law.195 According
to the problem-solving approach in global spaces, FPIC’s soft
legal status is not detrimental to its operation.
Despite the inability to precisely parse FPIC’s legal
definition, excitement over FPIC stems from the U.N. General
Assembly’s endorsement of UNDRIP, which explicitly ties
FPIC to Indigenous peoples’ right of self-determination.196
EMRIP reflects this when it writes that FPIC “needs to be
understood in the context of Indigenous peoples’ right to selfdetermination because it is an integral element of that right.”197
When connected to self-determination, FPIC appears to provide
Indigenous peoples with the ability to choose how non193
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Development, 78 EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 219, 245–48 (2009)
(“UNDRIP highlights the indivisibility of the concepts of FPIC and selfdetermined development and the fact that they are, in many regards, two
sides of the same coin.”); Carpenter & Riley, supra note 18, at 189–91.
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Indigenous decisions will influence them, make choices about
how to self-govern, develop, and otherwise exist. Oxfam’s
guidebook for Indigenous peoples and FPIC states that it “relates
directly to the right for Indigenous Peoples to control their own
future and the future of their people. It has been stated as the
right to give or withhold free, prior and informed consent to
actions that affect their lands, territories and natural
resources.”198 If FPIC is a mechanism for Indigenous peoples to
control their futures, it may be an important and transformative
concept for them, sustainable development, and settler-state
economies that rely on the extractive industries.199 The question
remains: even if FPIC is a mechanism for Indigenous selfdetermination, what obligates states to seek Indigenous
consent?200
B. FPIC’s Obligation?
The second problem with FPIC is that states, like the
United States, view UNDRIP, arguably the most authoritative
instrument containing FPIC,201 as a nonbinding, aspirational
document.202 From a strict legalistic approach, this softer status
results in an anxious search for obligatory authority.203 There
have been several attempts in international law to bypass FPIC’s
lack of obligation and claim that it is “required.” For instance,
Cathal Doyle points out that FPIC is grounded in Indigenous
peoples’ own legal histories and human rights so that if states
recognize that Indigenous peoples have their own legality, then
FPIC is required.204 Claire Charters has argued that the multiple
198
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199
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sources of Indigenous norms, perhaps like FPIC, generate
legitimacy under international law.205 Approaches that attempt
to demonstrate FPIC’s legitimacy are bids to increase the
perceptions of FPIC’s obligation. Increasing FPIC’s obligation
and definitional precision might make FPIC function as “harder”
legality, but doing so is implicitly committed to a legal
positivistic epistemology. If FPIC becomes treated as “hard
law,” then state actors may operate it according to state law,
similar to how Judge Boasberg oriented the Sioux Tribe’s Treaty
rights within domestic law.206
The following largely comports with both Doyle and
Charters’ views that Indigenous peoples have used their
influence to gain adoption of FPIC in many sources. However,
here, FPIC is oriented in a discussion about legality and global
spaces. If one desires to operate FPIC as a nation-state legal rule,
as a “top-down control using fixed statutes, detailed rules, and
judicial enforcement”207 style of law, then a concern with FPIC’s
precision or obligation is well founded. However, if states adopt
FPIC as a harder form of legality, then other state laws,
interpretations, or memos may conflict or override it when
judges treat it as domestic law.208 A failure to consider how
Indigenous peoples are operating FPIC in a global space
overlooks novel, nonstate-based approaches to legal practice.
V.

FPIC AND GLOBAL LAW

This section introduces William Twining’s framework of
global law,209 which aids in mapping the multiple and
overlapping levels of legality implicated by the Sioux Tribe’s
invocation of FPIC. The framework enables a mapping of FPIC
205
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at the nonstate, intercommunal, international human rights,
regional, and transnational levels, which works in conjunction
with but exceeds national law and the human rights discourse.
So even if FPIC is soft law, the problem-solving approach allows
the Sioux Tribe to operate FPIC as a softer legality in global
spaces.210 Cottrell and Trubek see law as promoting a normative
ordering, allowing disparate actors to coordinate their behavior
and solve common problems.211 According to them, rather than
“harder” or top-down legal enforcement that some commonly
associate with national levels of legality, disparate actors operate
soft law by stabilizing norms—to some degree—through
common agreement, which they enforce through peer
pressure.212
The Sioux Tribe’s operation of FPIC according to the
problem-solving approach avoids the need to search for precise
legal definition or harder obligating force.213 Social connections
among participants and communities exert peer pressure on each
other, which is observable between industry, states, NSAs, and
intercommunal networks as described below.214 However, peer
pressure is not always an adequate means for solving problems.
According to Cottrell and Trubek, “suasion, the potential for
public embarrassment and reputation costs are not enough, there
are other means to retain quality participation.”215 For Cottrell
and Trubek, “other means” are “destabilizing acts.”216 The Sioux
Tribe is pressuring IFIs and others to divest from the project,
which is a tactic that may destabilize the DAPL and engender

210

See Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 367.
Id. at 367.
212
Nation-state legality also involves the problem-solving approach in some
contexts. See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 13, at 540–41, 547–48.
213
Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 374; Abbott & Snidal, supra note
195, at 423.
214
Members of the Wangan and Jagalingou Family Council have travelled
to the U.K. to oppose banks funding the Carmichael Coal Mine. Jennifer
Rankin, Indigenous Australians call on Standard Chartered not to fund coal
mine project, THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/12/indigenousaustralians-wangan-jagalingou-standard-chartered-coal-mine-meeting
[http://perma.cc/8BDE-Z7DT]; similarly, the San Carlos Apache are
marching and protesting the Resolution Mine. Carina Dominguez, San
Carlos Apache tribe protest future copper mine, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb. 7,
2015), http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/2015/02/06/sancarlos-apache-tribe-protest-future-copper-mine/22997123/
[http://perma.cc/9DRT-5LFZ].
215
Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 374.
216
Id.
211

210

long-term repercussions for the viability of the fossil fuel
industry.
A. The Levels of Legality
Mapping the multiple levels of legality helps understand
how legal practice is changing because of globalization.217
Twining’s goal is to describe how globalization altered legal
practice so jurists can respond to the challenges they face.218 For
him, the idea of state-centric legal monism is a recent
phenomenon, one that many influential global actors—like state
actors—do not recognize.219 For Boaventura de Sousa Santos,
another theorist of globalization and law, globalization has
allowed us to rediscover that law, which some primarily think of
as state law, is interconnected and shot through with
supranational and local legal forces.220 Santos’s theorization of
oppositional hegemonic projects are particularly appropriate for
discussing Indigenous peoples’ activism involving multifaceted
legal approaches.221 Although Twining and Santos have
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drastically different projects,222 both of their notions of global
law are akin to Cottrell and Trubek’s idea, “multiple overlapping
legal orders that transcend conventional state boundaries.”223
This article primarily relies upon Twining’s map to articulate
how FPIC has developed as more than a human rights norm,
while Cottrell and Trubek’s problem-solving approach helps
explain how the Sioux Tribe is operating it. Twining defines
some levels like this:
Twining’s Levels of Legality224
International (in the classic sense of relations between
sovereign states and more broadly relations governed, for
example, by human rights or refugee law)
Regional (for example, the European Union, the European
Convention on Human Rights, and the Organization of
African Unity)
Transnational (for example, Islamic, Hindu, Jewish law,
Gypsy law, transnational arbitration, a putative lex
mercatoria, Internet law, and more controversially, the
internal governance of multinational corporations, the
Catholic Church, or institutions of organized crime)
Intercommunal (as in relations between religious
communities, or Christian Churches, or different ethnic
groups)
Municipal state (including the legal systems of nation
states, and subnational jurisdictions, such as Florida,
Greenland, Quebec, and Northern Ireland)
Nonstate (including laws of subordinated peoples, such as
native North Americans, or Maoris, or gypsies or illegal
legal orders such as Santos’s Pasagarda law, the Southern
People’s Liberation Army’s legal regime of Southern Sudan,
and the “common law movement” of militias in the United
States)225
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This framework presents an overview of some levels of
law that exist globally. It assists in articulating how FPIC
developed throughout multiple levels rather than as merely a
human rights concept.226 The following is not an exhaustive list
of all extranational levels of legality, nor is it an exhaustive list
of all sources of FPIC.227 It is one way of describing the creation
and dispersal of FPIC throughout multiple extranational levels,
which the Sioux Tribe is operating according to the problemsolving approch to oppose the DAPL.
B. The Nonstate Level of Legality
The nonstate level includes the “law of subordinated
peoples, such as native North Americans or Maoris.”228 Native
Americans, and those commonly called Indigenous peoples have
sui generis legal systems.229 In the Aboriginal Australian
context, Irene Watson succinctly describes this level, what she
calls “Raw Law,” as a “natural system of obligations and
benefits, flowing from an Aboriginal ontology.”230 Other
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Indigenous scholars from around the world similarly argue that
their legal systems continue to animate their ways of living.231
Indigenous peoples’ sui generis legal systems are sophisticated
and sometimes appear radical or contentious to people and
lawyers operating under national-monist legal epistemologies.232
However, there is little doubt that many Indigenous communities
are legally responsible for territories, ancestors, and peoples.233
When Indigenous peoples, who have responsibilities according
to their legal systems, conflict with industry actors, which have
countervailing legal responsibilities, one might think it is a clash
of cultures.
However, when tribes use the state-based legal regimes,
such as the Sioux Tribe’s legal claims under NHPA and NEPA
against the Corps and Dakota Access, LLC, there is a power
imbalance implicit at that legal level. Historically, states sanction
industry actors, like Dakota Access, LLC, while simultaneously
relegating and regulating tribal law as “culture” or something
even less than that. Even if tribes occasionally win when using
state law, say by forcing the Corps to substantiate its position on
the adequacy of a NEPA EA, using state law requires subjection
to the State, which may be what they are striving to challenge.
Occasionally, the fact that Indigenous peoples have sui
generis legal systems is obscured by the language tribal
members or Indigenous peoples employ. For instance, some
Indigenous peoples have articulated a right or interest in “selfdetermination,” which has given rise to an impressive amount of
interest in Indigenous self-determination.234 The treatment of
CREATION 135 (Sally Morgan, Tjalaminu Mia & Black Kwaymullina eds.,
2008) cited in BIRRELL, supra note 24, at 47.
231
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232
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Indigenous peoples’ self-determination as a right/principle
codified in international human rights law235 elides the fact that
many Indigenous peoples have struggled for the ability to selfrule and self-govern for hundreds of years before selfdetermination was codified in international law or human
rights.236
Accordingly, it should also be acknowledged that
Indigenous peoples’ self-determination is not just a human right
and there may be an uneasy translation from Tribal, Aboriginal,
or Indigenous peoples’ legal systems into rights-based analysis
or vice versa. Failure to appreciate problems with translation
may limit how others understand what Indigenous peoples’ mean
when they claim “self-determination” or any other rights for that
matter.237 It may be that self-determination or any correlative
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REV. 526–56 (2011); James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples to
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OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds.,
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Shaping Indigenous Self Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory
Solutions?, 13(4) INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 413 (2011); Alexandra
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MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION 15–34 (Nazila Ghanea &
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The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations to the
Genesis and Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
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rights are convenient legal-linguistic phrasing used to appeal to
legalistic sensibilities that represent more complex desires and
struggles for self-governance, control, or power.238
The Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL relies upon a
sui generis level of legality.239 When the Sioux Tribes claims
Treaty rights to “demand a more existential analysis,”240 it stands
as a reminder of the Sioux Tribe’s sovereign status with an
independent, sui generis legal system.241 Thus, the Sioux Tribe’s
use of the federal legal system and the invocation of international
human rights to oppose the DAPL involves sui generis law as
one of several overlapping levels of legality.
C. The Intercommunal Level of Legality
The intercommunal level of legality develops between
“religious communities, or Christian Churches, or different
ethnic groups.”242 Each tribe may have sui generis laws. When
tribes work together, they create intercommunal legality. The
most notable intercommunal legality that involves the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe is, perhaps, the International Indian Treaty
Council (IITC). The IITC has recently advocated on behalf of
the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe,243 and it is not surprising
considering the IITC’s historical formation. In 1974,
representatives from tribes scattered throughout the Americas
met on Standing Rock Sioux Reservation lands—the same lands
the Sioux Tribe seeks to protect by opposing the DAPL—and
formed the IITC.244 Immediately after its creation, the IITC
adopted the Declaration of Continuing Independence. The
Declaration may not have legal status under U.S. federal law, but
under inter-Indian law, it is a Declaration that charges the United
States with gross legal and moral violations, including
“wrongfully taking” the Black Hills from the Great Sioux
Nation.245 It also articulated an inter-Indian commitment to a
238
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unified legal and political struggle, which the IITC would help
disperse through the international, regional, and transnational
legal levels.
In 1977, the IITC assisted in creating the NonGovernmental Organization Conference on Discrimination
against Indigenous Populations, a group comprised of Indian
leaders from the Americas.246 That NGO met at the U.N.
headquarters and created the Draft Declaration of Principles for
the Defence of Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western
Hemisphere, which was a formal method of asking—if not
demanding—the U.N. prepare a similar declaration for all
Indigenous peoples.247 In 1982, U.N. Economic and Social
Council authorized the establishment of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations (WGIP).248 In 1983, the IITC introduced
the language of free, prior, and informed consent to the WGIP.249
Shortly afterwards, the WGIP decided to draft a U.N. instrument
to recognize and set standards for Indigenous peoples’ rights in
a formal manner.250 Over the following twenty years, the WGIP
and later the Working Group on the Draft Declaration debated
the draft, which culminated in the General Assembly’s
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endorsement of UNDRIP in 2007.251 Although UNDRIP is an
international human rights standard at the international level of
legality that some commentators see as not creating special
rights because it does not create any new rights,252 it was
influenced by sui generis and intercommunal level of Indigenous
legality and may protect sui generis and intercommunal level
legalities.253
Today, the IITC serves as “a voice and advocate for the
human rights of Indigenous Peoples.”254 In that capacity, it
called upon U.N. human rights institutions to attend to the
DAPL’s dispossession of the Sioux Tribe.255 In doing so, the
IITC cited self-determination and FPIC, international law on
treaties, a lack of domestic remedies, and other alleged harms.256
The IITC is not the only inter-Indian or inter-Indigenous legal
group. There is the International Work Group for Indigenous
Affairs, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Indian Law
Resource Center, Native American Rights Fund, National
Congress of American Indians, and others.257 Intercommunal
251
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For specific comments by some indigenous NSAs about FPIC, see, e.g.,
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Indigenous networks have supported the Sioux from as far away
as the Philippines, Australia, and Norway.258
While this might initially appear to be a way of
disseminating information and garnering support, it has material
effects. For instance, the Sami peoples of Norway have engaged
legal representation to pressure Norway’s Government Pension
Fund and Norway’s largest financial services group, DNB, to
divest from companies involved in the DAPL.259 That is an
example of how intercommunal actors use their legal system to
engage with transnational actors, discussed below, to pressure
divestment and destabilize the DAPL.
The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe received support from
inter-Indigenous networks that work in conjunction with NSAs
like Cultural Survival and Amnesty International.260 At the
request of Chairman Archambault, Amnesty International wrote
a letter to the United States Department of Justice requesting an
investigation into violations of national, international, and
human rights law by the local police.261 Amnesty International
258
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2016), http://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/the-point-with-stan-grant/article/
2016/11/14/joe-williams-takes-aboriginal-flag-standing-rock
[https://perma.cc/XB39-P8Q4]; Jenni Monet, Standing Rock Joins the
World’s Indigenous Fighting for Land and Life, YES! MAG. (Sept. 30,
2016), http://www.yesmagazine.org/people-power/standing-rock-joins-theworlds-indigenous-fighting-for-land-and-life-20160930
[https://perma.cc/B5BV-AVBK].
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also wrote letters to the local sheriff’s department to express
concerns over their use of force.262 Many organizations, like
Amnesty International, have used social media as a means for
gathering evidence and collecting information in their effort to
support the Sioux Tribe.263
The widespread use and effects of social media by
intercommunal legal actors has influenced American lawmakers.
They have influenced cities such as Sacramento, Seattle, and Los
Angeles, which have passed resolutions backing the Sioux Tribe
against the DAPL and leading them to divest from banks that
fund the DAPL.264 Similarly, United States Senator Bernie
Sanders drew attention to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in a
speech, which he then followed with a letter to then-sitting
President Obama to halt the pipeline.265 The Corps noted the
increase in attention generated by social media as a complicating
aspect of the DAPL development.266
Under a legal problem-solving approach, the Sioux Tribe
and its intercommunal legal networks have operated FPIC to
pressure Dakota Access, LLC and the federal government to
seek its consent and solve this common problem or face greater
destabilization. In doing so, the Sioux Tribe and its
US_DOJ_letter_Lynch_regarding_investigtion_and_observation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/823F-Q89F].
262
Letter from Margaret Huang, Exec. Dir., Amnesty Int’l U.S., to Kyle
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intercommunal networks have invoked FPIC as international
human rights law.
D. The International Human Rights Level
The international level of legality is “the classic sense of
relations between sovereign states and more broadly relations
governed, for example, by human rights or refugee law.”267 At
the international legal level, the Sioux Tribe has invoked treaties
as well as Indigenous peoples’ rights recognized in the
international human rights regime, particularly FPIC and selfdetermination.268 Indigenous peoples’ ability to work across
communities, NSAs, inter-Indigenous networks, and
international bodies have drawn attention to the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL. The Sioux Tribe’s
invocation of FPIC and self-determination as recognized in
UNDRIP and supported by intercommunal legalities is evidence
of the discursive construction of legality at the international
level.269 Although UNDRIP is the most important international
instrument for FPIC, there are other influential instruments.
In 1989, the International Labour Organization
Convention No. 169 established FPIC in a binding document for
ratifying governments, which does not include the United
States.270 Convention No. 169 requires FPIC for relocation
purposes and requires ratifying countries to consult with
Indigenous communities regarding development that influences
them and their traditional lands.271 Other international
267
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270
See generally BIRGITTE FEIRING, INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INDIGENOUS
AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO ILO CONVENTION
NO. 169 (2009),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/
publication/wcms_106474.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9EW-9PU4]; LUIS
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INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ILO REGIME (1919–1989), at 291-331 (2005)
(arguing that the ILO’s adoption of Convention No. 169 was an act of
bureaucratic territoriality in response to the WGIPs declaration drafting).
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institutions and instruments have recognized Indigneous
peoples’ FPIC.272 A prominent example is the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s recommendation that
states should ensure “that no decisions directly relating to
[Indigenous peoples’] rights and interests are taken without their
informed consent.”273 Where previous international instruments,
such as the Convention No. 169, used the language of selfdetermination without naming it as such,274 UNDRIP expressly
ties FPIC to self-determination through its content and
conceptual framework.275 Because UNDRIP links Indigenous
participation to their self-determination, some identify UNDRIP
as perhaps “the most comprehensive and progressive of
international instruments dealing with Indigenous peoples’
Lecture at the Castan Centre for Human Rights at Monash University: The
Participation of Indigenous Peoples in the United Nations System’s Political
Institutions (May 27, 2004),
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/speeches/participation-indigenouspeoples-united-nations-systems-political-institutions
[https://perma.cc/7DVG-6LWE]; LEENA HEINAMAKI ET AL., ACTUALIZING
SÁMI RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE RESEARCH 227 (2017) (“[i]n
1992, the [Earth Summit] in Rio succeeded to shift the role of Indigenous
peoples from the objects of protection to subjects of co-operation.”). The
Earth Summit saw the creation of three major agreements and guidelines
aimed at altering the approaches to development, including Agenda 21, the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the Statement of
Forest Principles. Importantly, the conference delegates agreed “not to carry
out any activities on the lands of indigenous peoples that would cause
environmental degradation or that would be culturally inappropriate.” FRED
M SHELLEY, THE WORLD’S POPULATION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRITICAL
ISSUES, CRISES, AND EVER-GROWING COUNTRIES 51 (2015). Both Agenda
21 and the Rio Declaration are not legally binding, but they conceptually
bound Indigenous identity to environmental conservation. The Convention
on Biological Diversity, which was opened for signatures at the Earth
Summit, also contains an FPIC clause. U.N. Convention on Biological
Diversity art. 8(j), Mar. 8, 1994, 1771 U.N.T.S. 430.
272
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rights.”276 From a more critical perspective, Karen Engle notes
that UNDRIP “contains significant compromises. Embedded in
it are serious limitations to the very rights it is praised for
containing.”277
Undoubtedly there are limitations to the UNDRIP, but it
is worth emphasizing the UNDRIP does not “grant” rights. It
recognizes that Indigenous peoples have rights and calls upon
states to recognize them. The call to “recognize” is vague, but
the flexibility inherent in that vagueness allow Indigenous
peoples to draw from multiple and overlapping international,
intercommunal, sui generis, and other legalities that defy
conventional “top-down control using fixed statutes, detailed
rules, and judicial enforcement”278 style of state-based legal
regimes.
At the international level of legality, the U.N. has created
the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Expert
Mechanisms on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to
facilitate recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights. All three
have actively promoted FPIC279 alongside the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.280 The Sioux Tribe, with
the assistance of NSAs and intercommunal legal actors, such as
the IITC, has appealed to the U.N. to send human rights
observers to the protest site.281
276
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The current Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, called for a halt to
the DAPL and later visited with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
to investigate in greater detail.282 Tauli-Corpuz wrote,
[t]he United States should, in accordance with its
commitment to implement the Declaration on the
Rights [of] Indigenous Peoples, consult with the
affected communities in good faith and ensure
their free, and informed consent prior to the
approval of a project affecting their lands,
particularly in connection with extractive
resource industries.283
Similarly, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of
Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai, called for a
halt to pipeline construction after the protest turned violent.284 At
the invitation of Chairman Archambault, an expert member of
the U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Chief Edward
John, spent three days at the protest site.285 John later wrote a
letter noting a host of issues and potential breaches of
international human rights.286 Several NSAs, including the IITC
and Cultural Survival, supported John’s visitation.287 Following
John’s visit, the U.N. Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/human-rights-observer-reportmission-standing-rock-sioux-reservation [https://perma.cc/WA56-CNMZ].
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Indigenous Issues, Alvaro Pop Ac, released a statement
reiterating concerns over the proposed pipeline route and a lack
of consultation with the Sioux.288
None of these U.N. actor’s actions can enforce the United
States’ compliance through force or sanctions.289 They primarily
exert pressure, which perhaps, the United States and other states
shrug off. However, a Member state’s poor record of human
rights compliance over time may signal to industry actors that
development projects, such as the DAPL, are riskier than they
appear. The intercommunal actors created FPIC as partially
based on and to ptorect on their sui generis legal systems and
have pressured international legal actors to adopt it.290 The
international level has been discursively constructed and adopted
FPIC in connection with the regional and transnational levels.291
E. The Regional Level of Legality
Examples of the regional level of legality are, according
to Twining, the European Union, the European Convention on
Human Rights, and the Organization of African Unity.292 The
regional level includes the Inter-American System of Human
Rights, which has developed a jurisprudence for Indigenous
rights that includes FPIC.293 A commission and a court constitute
288
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the Inter-American System and both have articulated a
requirement for governments to obtain Indigenous peoples’
consent.294 Anaya and Williams argue that these developments
show how a court may interprete Indigenous peoples rights,
perhaps such as FPIC, as a legal entitlement and are indicative
of regional customary law.295 In Awas Tingni, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights ordered the State to demarcate
and title Indigenous territory to ensure that no acts on the part of
the State or private parties would affect Awas Tingni enjoyment
of its territories.296 The subsequent case law Awas Tingni builds
upon this ruling and goes so far as to describe states’ duty to
Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 165, 188–90
(2011) (same).
294
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obtain FPIC in some situations.297 As a regional body, the InterAmerican System does not exercise global jurisdiction.
However, it is sufficient to note that regional bodies, like the
Inter-American System, recognize FPIC as a legal right and
tribes, like the Sioux Tribe, are now using it.
In December 2016, the Standing Rock Sioux, along with
the Cheyenne River Sioux and Yankton Sioux Tribes,
announced they had requested that the Inter-American
Commission investigate Dakota Access, LLC and the federal
government for failure to consult.298 On December 9, 2016, the
Standing Rock Sioux testified at the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights.299 The jurisprudential trend of
the Inter-American system suggests that the Sioux will find a
friendly Commission. However, the court is unlikely to weigh in
because the federal government has asserted that both the
Commission and the Court lack jurisdiction over United States
matters.
Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States evinces the
federal government’s stance toward the commission.300
Members of the Western Shoshone complained to the
commission that the federal government allowed and facilitated
mining developments on their land without their consultation.301
The Commission found the federal government violated the
Danns’ property rights and required United States courts to
consider their individual and collective rights and informed
participation.302 In response, the federal government asserted a
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lack of jurisdiction.303 The Sioux Tribe will find a Commission
with a jurisprudence that supports Indigenous peoples’ FPIC, but
the federal government will likely again adopt the stance it did
toward the Dann case. The Commission’s finding for the Sioux
Tribe may, however, lend support and pressure for its struggle.
Many of the multiple and overlapping levels of legality
work together to pressure Dakota Access, LLC and the federal
government. But without an enforcement mechanism or some
way to convert that pressure into a force that Dakota Access,
LLC and the federal government care about, then all that
pressure may be for naught. A surprising and unlikely place to
find a degree of enforcement resides within the transnational
level of legality.
F. The Transnational Level of Legality
The transnational level of legality includes “transnational
arbitration, a putative lex mercatoria, Internet law, and more
controversially, the internal governance of multinational
corporations . . . or institutions of organized crime.”304 Although
Twining views the internal governance of multinational
corporations as controversial, Fleur Johns has argued that “the
corporation has long been a feature of international legal practice
and argument, [but] it is nonetheless one upon which public
international lawyers have tended to look askance.”305 The rules
corporations adopt for themselves are an unlikely place for an
enforcement mechanism, but to the extent those rules shape
corporate and state behaviors, they also shape international and
transnational practice. The Sioux Tribe and its network’s ability
to publish and disperse information on corporate internal
governance mechanisms attempts to hold corporations
accountable to own their standards or face divestment.
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1. The Applicable Transnational Legality
While human rights standards at the international and
regional levels address the obligations and aspirations of states,
which the federal government may reject as not legally
obligatory, the transnational level initially appears even more
unlikely to restrict action. As well noted by John Ruggie, the
transnational corporate level suffers from a “gap in governance”
that leaves corporations unregulated.306 In response to the
identification of the transnational governance gap, the U.N.
Security-Generals appointed Ruggie as the Special
Representative for Business and Human Rights. In that role,
Ruggie developed the “Protect, Respect, Remedy”
framework.307 It clarifies that states are required to protect
human rights through legislative action, while corporations are
required to respect human rights. Certainly, “respect” generates
little authority for strict legalists who consider top-down legal
styles as the sole standard for legality.
However, the U.N. General Principles on Business and
Human Rights (UNGPs) promulgate a standard that requires
corporations and other NSAs to respect recognized human rights
even where the host government does not.308 The UNGPs do not
directly reference FPIC or the UNDRIP but note that
“enterprises should respect the human rights of individuals
belonging to specific groups or populations that require
particular attention . . . In this connection, United Nations
instruments have elaborated further on the rights of indigenous
peoples[.]”309 The UNGP’s direction that corporations should
consider “U.N. instruments . . . on the rights of indigenous
peoples,” is consistent with the former Special Rapporteur on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples James Anaya’s view that
businesses must respect Indigenous rights contained in UNDRIP
306
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like FPIC.310 If U.N. bodies say that states need to obtain
Indigenous peoples’ FPIC and corporations must respect
recognized human rights, a consequence is that corporations also
need to respect Indigenous peoples’ FPIC. Admittedly, “respect”
remains a vague legal standard. Where corporations fail to
respect Indigenous FPIC, potentially injured tribes can use
FPIC’s definitional vagueness and its softness to generate
resistance by naming, blaming and by encouraging destabilizing
acts.311
Alongside the creation of the UNGPs, multilateral
lending institutions and corporations sought to become part of
the human rights discourse by articulating and adopting
standards for Indigenous participation in development projects,
including FPIC. A noncomprehensive list includes:
•

•

The World Bank Environmental and Social
Framework from August 2016 applies to
borrowing countries;312
The International Council on Mining and
Minerals (ICMM) 2013 Indigenous Peoples
and Mining Position Statement is a voluntary
initiative for the mining industry;313
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•

•

The International Finance Corporation’s
2012 Performance Standard 7 on Indigenous
Peoples for private borrowers;314 and
The Equator Principles III has adopted the
language for the International Finance
Corporation’s (IFC) Performance Standard
for lenders or financiers of extractive industry
projects.315

When corporations adopt voluntary initiatives, like the ICMM,
or are required to comply with lender/financier restrictions, like
the Equator Principles III (EP III), they commit to higher
participatory standards for Indigenous peoples where their
actions will affect Indigenous peoples. These voluntary
standards are “nonlegal” in the sense that state courts cannot
enforce these standards against those who sign up for them but
do not comply.316 Nevertheless, within a global space, they can
be powerful.317 Importantly, these initiatives provide Indigenous
peoples with a means for partially circumventing strictly
positivistic national legal systems to articulate and solve
problems, which Ruggie seems to approve.318 Despite states’
hesitancy to embrace or recognize Indigenous rights as a distinct
category of legal protections, corporations and IFIs are
314
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increasingly pressured to respect Indigenous rights as a category
of human rights protections.319 Where corporations commit
themselves to higher standards for Indigenous peoples’
participation but do not adhere to those standards, they may face
destabilizing acts from different levels of legality.320
2. Destabilizing Tactics
The Sioux Tribe is combining tactics to destabilize the
DAPL. First, as discussed above, they delay the project by
engaging with national legal processes.321 And, second, as
evaluated here, they problematize funding by pressuring IFIs to
divest from the project or face divestment from the Sioux Tribe’s
supporters.
Rachel Davis and Daniel Franks argue that one of the
major issues facing extractive industry projects today is delays
resulting from inadequate consultation and a failure to obtain a
social license to operate.322 Delay may result from various
actions such as lawsuits, project modifications, lost productivity,
theft, roadblocks, reputational costs, or fines.323 They estimate
that delayed extractive industry projects valued at $3–5 billion
dollars lose nearly $20 million in revenue each week.324 Energy
Transfer Partners, the principal shareholder of Dakota Access,
LLC, values the DAPL delay costs at $3.8 billion.325
In November 2016, Dakota Access, LLC requested an
expedited ruling on its motion for summary judgment and, in
support, claimed that it was suffering irreparable “harm alone
[which] is $83.3 million per month of delay (or $2.7 million per
day).”326 In a hearing, Judge Boasberg denied Dakota Access,
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LLC’s motion.327 Media outlets then reported that Dakota
Access had lost over $450 million due to delays.328
The Sioux Tribe’s multiple rounds of litigation
successfully delayed the project. Although currently operational,
the ability to temporarily increase production costs by seeking
further legal review may make continued operation of the DAPL
or future natural resource development projects less attractive to
investors where FPIC is not obtained. When the Sioux Tribe’s
ability to use the United States legal system to delay is combined
with its ability to use pressure to encourage divestment from the
DAPL, the project, as well as future fossil fuel projects, may
become fatally destabilized.
The Sioux’s divestment tactics may work because many of
the DAPL’s IFIs have adopted lending restrictions, such as EP
III,329 which explicitly requires an FPIC standard for projects like
the DAPL. Of the thirty-five IFIs that have invested in or lent to
the DAPL,330 twenty-three have adopted EP III.331 The EP III
expressly referenced Ruggie’s principle of “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” and mandates FPIC according to the IFC’s
Performance Standards.332 As long as the twenty-three IFIs that
have adopted EP III comply, the IFIs are required to take several
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steps. The IFIs must publicly report that the DAPL has failed to
seek or achieve FPIC, establish a grievance mechanism, and
engage an independent environmental and social consultant to
carry out an independent review of the project.333 These processes
are costly and make lending to the DAPL developers less desirable.
There are two problems with voluntary initiatives, like EP
III. First, voluntary initiatives were created for industry selfregulation.334 Even if the Sioux Tribe and its partners are
publishing information on the lenders while mobilizing public
support to divest, these tactics depend on IFIs divesting or having
supporters divest from those IFIs. Publishing internal governance
regulations may be a means for publicly enforcing private, selfregulating voluntary initiatives to hold transnational actors
accountable. It remains possible that even if there is pressure to
divest, people simply do not.
Second, voluntary initiatives, like EP III, tend not to apply
in the United States because it is treated as a “designated country,”
a country “deemed to have robust environmental and social
governance, legislation system and institutional capacity designed
to protect their people and the natural environment.”335 Even if the
United States is a “designated country” that appears to have
“robust” legal protections, the Sioux Tribe and its partners’
opposition to the DAPL has successfully highlighted the
deficiencies of state-level legal protections. For instance, in May
2017, ten banks that had invested in the DAPL and had signed onto
the EP III wrote to the Equator Principles Association.336 They
expressed concern that “(i) local laws in relation to engagement
with indigenous communities are lacking compared to best
practice for FPIC . . . and (ii) banks had no leverage as there was
no breach with the applicable environmental & [sic] social
standards being used.”337 The letter continued, “[i]n addition to the
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reputation damage that this has caused to the banks involved, we
believe that this is likely to damage the reputation of the Equator
Principles (EPs) as a ‘golden standard’ and a common playing field
for determining, assessing and managing environmental and social
risks in projects.”338 This letter might suggest that the EPs are
ineffective regulations for an unaccountable industry. On the other
hand, the letter demonstrates the Sioux Tribe’s effectiveness. The
letter further requested EP standards to apply to projects in
designated countries and create a working group to generate
proposals on how to facilitate resolution where there has been a
breach of the EPs.339
In mounting their opposition to the DAPL, the Sioux Tribe
has exposed the inadequate state-level legal protections of
supposed designated countries by forcing EPs and other similar
voluntary initiatives into a crisis: they must take seriously
Indigenous peoples’ consent or admit the “golden standards” are
little more than greenwashing. Either way, the Sioux Tribe and its
networks will not relent. The Sioux’s networks of Indigenous and
environmental activists continue publicizing information on who
has invested and how individuals can pressure those institutions to
divest.340
The networks have created websites to track which banks
have invested341 and how much has been purposefully divested.342
The Norwegian public and the Sami peoples pressured DNB of
Norway to divest.343 DNB originally engaged an independent
human rights investigator to develop recommendations as to
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whether it should divest.344 It then sold its ownership interest in
the companies that were building the DAPL.345 Investors such as
BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, and Société Générale have
previously divested from natural resource projects that faced
social resistance.346 The Sioux Tribe and anti-DAPL networks
are doing the same and have publicly called to meet with the
IFIs.347 The most dramatic implementation thus far has been the
Seattle City Council’s divestment of $3 billion from Wells Fargo
for supporting the DAPL.348
If one looks at any singular event, such as the Sioux
Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL, it might appear as though
individual tribes are continuing to lose their fights against large
natural resource development. Under a broader view, the Sioux
Tribe’s tactics are consistent with tactics Indigenous peoples are
using around the globe.349 At a global level, the Sioux Tribe has
mobilized delay and divestment tactics in a way that suggests the
formalization of networks and connections between tribes,
344
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environmental groups, and anti–fossil fuel activists. The ability
of the Sioux Tribe and others to delay development while
pushing for divestment may, in the end, stand as a significant
threat to potential developments and investors—even in
designated countries—where Indigenous consent and
consultation is not sought. If these tactics continue, the cost of
pursuing fossil fuel development may increase to the point where
it is no longer economically viable.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Sioux Tribe’s operation and invocation of FPIC is an
important development that should be understood according to
the legal problem approach in global spaces. The Sioux Tribe’s
activism against the DAPL is broader than a state-based legal
challenge. Its invocation of FPIC and self-determination is not
merely an international human rights claim. The point of
contestation appears to be whether a pipeline can be built
through a relatively small piece of territory. However, in
opposing the DAPL crossing that territory, the Tribe has
interjected alternative legal levels that are overlaid by historical
and global struggles. It has invoked FPIC as a concept and begun
operating it as law in a global space, one that has multiple and
overlapping sui generis, intercommunal, international, regional,
and transnational legalities.
State actors are confined by jurisdictional mandates: the
Corps is constrained by what it can consider in the same way that
District Court Judges are constrained by what they can consider.
Industry actors often consider the state legal regime as the
preeminent source of law, which in many cases has been a sound
practice. That practice is becoming increasingly risky. Some
human rights advocates and Indigenous peoples believe that
states should recognize Indigenous peoples’ FPIC. If that were
to happen, state judges might treat FPIC as a feature of domestic
law just as Judge Boasberg dealt with the Treaty rights the Sioux
Tribe claimed.350 Judges, as restricted by state law, may then fail
to consider tribal “existential” concerns,351 while further
subjecting them to the State.
The Sioux Tribe’s activism demonstrates the operation
of FPIC according to the problem-solving approach. The Tribe
must engage with state legality, and it can use that legality to
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delay the project. Simultaneously, it can engage with industry
actors by directly impacting development funding. In doing so,
the Sioux Tribe has highlighted that Indigenous peoples have
global reach and can impact designated countries just as much as
developing countries. It may be that Indigenous peoples are
translating their knowledge into norms that operate according to
a nonstate-centric model of legality, a global practice that will
guide behavior and effectively resolve disputes by taking their
“existential” concerns seriously.352
This article has clarified how the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe is operating FPIC through multiple and overlapping levels
of legality and mounting pressure upon IFIs at the transnational
level. The Standing Rock Sioux and other Indigenous
communities have created and begun engaging in sophisticated
multilevel legal approaches that may mitigate the pernicious
effects of state law. The Sioux Tribe has engaged in litigation at
the state-level legal processes, but they have also become
sophisticated tacticians at other legal levels, which might not be
visible to attorneys who are primarily concerned with state law.
The Sioux are using the multiple extranational levels to pressure
both industry and the federal government. State and industry
actors may continue to ignore Indigenous peoples and their
unique histories, and may fail to understand how FPIC is
operating throughout the extranational levels. However, the
forces of law are changing and, in no small measure, it is
changing because of peoples like the Oceti Sakowin.
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